Cite as: The People v. Susan Angel, 570925/10, NYLJ 1202584819341, at *1 (App. Tm., 1st, Decided October 3, 2012)

Before: Shulman, J.P., Hunter, Jr., Torres, JJ.

Decided: October 3, 2012




Defendant appeals from a judgment of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, New York County (Larry R.C. Stephen, J.), rendered October 5, 2010, after a non-jury trial, convicting her of stalking in the fourth degree and harassment in the second degree, and imposing sentence.


Judgment of conviction (Larry R.C. Stephen, J.), rendered October 5, 2010, affirmed.

Defendant was convicted, after a bench trial, of fourth-degree stalking (Penal Law §120.45[3]) and second-degree harassment (Penal Law §240.26[3]) upon evidence that, in violation of at least two court orders issued during contentious divorce proceedings between her and the complainant, defendant repeatedly caused multiple flyers to be distributed in front of the complainant's workplace;




that the flyers featured a visibly altered photograph of the complainant, unclothed, lying next to the couple's infant daughter, with accompanying, disparaging text; and that defendant's dissemination of the flyers "frustrated" the complainant's employer (The Bank of Tokyo) and caused the complainant to fear that his managerial position at the bank was threatened.

Since defendant's generic motion for a trial order of dismissal failed to identify the specific issues now raised, her present challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence is unpreserved (see People v. Hawkins, 11 NY3d 484, 492 [2008]), and we decline to review it in the interest of justice. As an alternative holding, we find that the verdict was based on legally sufficient evidence. The nature, content and volume of the offensive flyers demonstrated that they were distributed "for no legitimate purpose" (Penal Law §§120.45, 240.26[3]) and were sufficient to satisfy the "reasonabl[e] fear" element of the stalking charge here involved (Penal Law §120.45[3]). Moreover, we are satisfied that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence.

Defendant's remaining assignments of error regarding




the conduct of the trial are similarly unpreserved and lacking in merit. Evidence of other acts directed against the complainant during the couple's volatile divorce was properly admitted, since it was probative of defendant's motive and intent and provided relevant background information as to the relationship between defendant and the complainant (see People v. Ebanks, 60 AD3d 462 [2009], lv denied 12 NY3d 924 [2009]; People v. Morris, 82 AD3d 908 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 808 [2011]). Nor does the record reveal any prosecutorial misconduct, and certainly none compromising defendant's right to a fair trial (see People v. Galloway, 54 NY2d 396, 401 [1981]).

Inasmuch as defendant has already served her sentence, her arguments relating to the claimed excessiveness of the sentence are academic.