ESTATE OF ALVIN RODERICK LEWIS Deceased (2007-3126) — Anne Evangeline Friday (Friday), decedent's niece, and Sean Cadell (Cadell), decedent's grandson, filed a petition dated December 1, 2009, seeking to have admitted to probate the copy of an instrument dated November 19, 2004 (the 2004 will), which purports to be the last will and testament of Alvin Roderick Lewis. Selwyn Lewis (Selwyn), decedent's son, filed objections dated June 1, 2011, to the petition alleging lack of due execution, lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, and fraud. Decedent's other son, Clinton Lewis (Clinton), neither appeared nor filed objections. Friday and Cadell1 move for summary judgment dismissing Selwyn's objections and admitting the decedent's will to probate. Selwyn cross-moves for summary judgement on his objections.

In support of the motion, petitioners submit, inter alia, (i) Friday's affidavit dated February 9, 2012, (ii) James I. Williams's affirmation dated March 19, 2012, (iii) James I. Williams's affidavit dated March 7, 2012, (iv) affidavit of Dustin J. Dente, (v) copy of decedent's will, (vi) copy of the receipt of Dustin J. Dente acknowledging possession of original documents related to decedent's estate, (vii) copies of a power of attorney and health care proxy executed by decedent selecting Friday as agent, (vii) transcript of the examination before trial of Carolina Silva.

In opposition to proponent's motion and in support of his cross-motion, Selwyn submits, inter alia, (i) Edward Harold King's affirmation dated May 31, 2012, (ii) Selwyn's affidavit dated May 31, 2012, (iii) the affidavit of Kenneth Laidlow (Laidlow) dated May 31, 2012, (iv) the affidavit of Selwyn N. St. Hillaire, (St. Hillaire) dated May 31, 2012, (v) the transcript of the examination before trial of Friday's attorney James I. Williams.

Decedent passed away on July 15, 2006, survived by his children, Selwyn and Clinton. On April 7, 1971, the decedent and his late wife, Gladys Lewis, executed instruments in which each bequeathed their entire estate to the surviving spouse. Upon the death of the surviving spouse, the instruments apportioned the remaining estate to their children in equal shares. Ms. Lewis predeceased the decedent. In an instrument dated November 19, 2004, which is now at issue, decedent named Friday executor and reduced the bequests made to his children from the one-half to each set out in the 1971 will, to onefourth each. Decedent also created a testamentary trust for Selwyn's benefit and named Friday as trustee. This instrument also bequeathed one-eighth of decedent's estate to each of his two nieces, Friday and Robertha Lewis, and made bequests to his grandchildren.

According to Friday, after Ms. Lewis's death, decedent asked her to help him put his legal affairs in order. Friday, a resident of Canada, obliged by making trips to assist him. On October 28, 2004, decedent gave Friday power of attorney. Thereafter, the decedent and Friday retained James I. Williams, Esq. ("Williams") to draft and supervise the execution of the instrument that is the subject of the present proceeding. The instrument was prepared by Williams, executed by decedent and witnessed by Williams, Harvey Lynch and Caroline Silva on November 14, 2004. On the same day, decedent also executed a health care proxy in favor of Friday. Throughout this time, Selwyn had committed himself to an "institution" for treatment related to alcohol abuse.

Williams in his affirmation states that although he does not remember in detail the particulars of decedent's execution ceremony, he remembers that it was consistent with his customary practice in such matters. Normally, when preparing wills, Williams meets with the testator to explain the features of the will and map out a rough draft. Once the final draft is complete, the testator is asked to review it and make whatever changes or corrections are deemed necessary. Once those are made, the testator schedules a time to execute the will. Once the final version of the instrument is approved, Williams invites the testator and the witnesses into a conference room. He then presents the testator with the original instrument, introduces the witnesses and instructs the testator to 1) declare before the witnesses that the instrument is his Last Will and Testament and 2) ask the witnesses to witness his signing of the will. Once the instrument, attestation clause and self-proving affidavits are all signed, Williams or his assistant makes two copies of the document. One copy is placed in Williams's file, and the other is given to the executor. The original is given to the testator. Williams annotates his copy of the instrument with the word "copy" on the front page.

Williams does not recall any significant deviation from his usual practice in decedent's case except that Friday was present at the execution. Williams emphasizes that neither the decedent nor Friday were strangers to him at the time of the execution. Williams had known decedent for at least 10 years prior to the execution as decedent lived not far from Williams's office and Williams had represented him and his late wife in Housing Court matters. He notes also that he had known Friday for about 5 years prior to the execution as she had accompanied decedent to his office on earlier occasions. He notes also that having known decedent over the years, he saw nothing out of the ordinary in decedent's behavior the day of the execution.

Williams recalls that at the decedent's execution ceremony, consistent with his usual procedure, he made two copies of the executed instrument and wrote the word "copy" on the front page. He then gave the original and one copy to the decedent and retained one copy for himself. Decedent turned the original over to Friday for safe-keeping and retained the copy for himself.

After decedent's passing, Friday gave the original will to Dustin Dente, (Dente) an attorney she retained to probate the will. Dente issued her a receipt for the document dated October 24, 2007. Not long thereafter, however, Dente was disbarred. The will was never returned to Friday. In an affidavit dated November 9, 2009, Dente asserts that he was "unable to produce the original will due to the closure of [his] law office as a result of pending legal difficulties." Friday therefore offers the copy of the executed will maintained by Williams for probate.

Selwyn asserts that the 2004 will should not be admitted to probate as a lost will because the decedent had intended to revoke it. These assertions rest on mostly hearsay allegations by Selwyn, Laidlow and St. Hillaire that Friday repeatedly refused to respect decedent's requests that she return the original 2004 will so he could tear it up, that decedent suspected her of wanting to steal his house and his assets, and that she had a reputation among family members to be one who appears whenever a relative is ill or dying to take possession of his or her belongings. Additionally, Selwyn alleges that the instrument was the product of fraud and undue influence, and that the decedent lacked testamentary capacity to execute the will. No medical or other records are submitted to support these claims.

Summary Judgment

Summary judgement may be granted in a probate proceeding when there exists no triable issue of fact. In re Leach, 3 A.D.3d 763 (3d Dep't 2004). If the moving party makes a prima facie case, the party opposing the motion must produce evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to establish the existence of a material issue of fact that would require a trial. Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557, 562 (1980). The opposing party must lay bare his proof. Towner v. Towner, 225 A.D.2d 614, 615 (2d Dep't 1996). In other words, in order to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the respondent must demonstrate, by allegations that are specific, detailed and substantiated by admissible evidence in the record, that there is a genuine triable issue of fact. Mere conclusory assertions will not suffice, Matter of O'Hara, 85 A.D.2d 669, 671 (2d Dep't 1981), and nor will general conclusory allegations that contain no specific factual reference. McGahee v. Kennedy, 48 N.Y.2d 832 (1979).

The Photocopy of the Decedent's Will May be Admitted to Probate

A lost or destroyed will may be admitted to probate where the requirements of SCPA 1407 are met. SCPA 1407 requires that 1) the will not have been revoked, 2) that the will have been duly executed, and 3) that its provisions be proved by each of at least two credible witnesses or by a copy or draft of the will proved to be true and complete. Friday has shown to the satisfaction of the court that each of these requirements was met.

1) The Decedent's Will was not Revoked:

A will may be revoked by another will, a writing of the testator indicating the intention to revoke, or by a physical act, such as burning, tearing or cutting performed by the testator or by another person acting on behalf of and in the presence of the testator. EPTL 3-4.1. Where a will that was in the testator's possession at the time of testator's death cannot be found, a strong but rebuttable presumption of revocation arises. In re Evans, 264 A.D.2d 482 (2d Dep't 1999). Where, however, a will is lost or destroyed and the decedent did not have possession of it at the time of his death, it is then presumed that the will was destroyed without the decedent's knowledge or consent and thus not revoked. Matter of Levinsohn, 5 Misc.2d 605 (Surr. Ct. New York Co. 1957). In those circumstances, the will is deemed valid, and the copy may be admitted to probate. Id.

According to both Friday's and Williams's sworn statements, and as acknowledged by Selwyn, St. Hillaire and Laidlow, decedent never had the original will in his possession. After decedent's death on July 15, 2006, Friday gave the instrument to attorney Dustin J. Dente whom she had hired to handle the probate. Appended to her papers is a receipt signed by Dente acknowledging receipt of original documents concerning the probate of decedent's will, and a retainer agreement confirming their professional relationship for purposes of the probate. Dente, however, was subsequently disbarred and denied access to his files or his office and was unable to retrieve the will necessitating proceeding on the copy.

According to Laidlow and St. Hillaire, decedent's cousins, the decedent had intended to revoke the November 19, 2004 will and had repeatedly asked Friday to return it to him so he could destroy it, but that Friday, who lived in Canada, refused to return it to him, taking advantage of his feeble state to enrich herself. The court is not persuaded by these assertions. A testator may revoke a will not only by tearing it up, but by executing a new will, or by a writing clearly indicating an intention to effect such revocation if made with the formalities prescribed for the execution of a will. See EPTL 3-4.1. Testator did neither. By Laidlow and St. Hillaire's own admission, Friday resided in Canada and was infrequently in New York. Moreover, according to them, they were decedent's principal caregivers after the death of his wife. They offer, however, no explanation why they did not assist the decedent in consulting with an attorney to give effect to decedent's alleged intention to revoke the 2004 will. There exists here no concrete, specific evidence of revocation. The court is offered only the hearsay statements of witnesses concerning an alleged vociferously expressed intention to revoke the will.

Friday has demonstrated to the satisfaction of the court that the now lost instrument decedent executed on November 19, 2004 was not in decedent's possession at the time of his death. Friday asserts and Selwyn acknowledges that the original will was never in decedent's possession, but was in that of Friday. Moreover, no intervening instrument was executed by decedent that would likewise have the effect of having revoked the instrument now at issue. Thus, the will not being in decedent's possession at the time of his death, and no intervening document having been executed, the presumption of revocation does not apply in this case. See In re Levinsohn, 5 Misc.2d 605 (Surr.Ct. New York Co. 1957).

2). The Instrument was Duly Executed

Subject to exceptions, due execution of a will requires that the will be in writing and signed at the end by the testator in the presence of at least two witnesses who also sign the will. E.P.T.L. §3-2.1. The burden of proving that the will was properly he testator in the presence of at least two witnesses, who executed falls to the movant. In re Watson, 37 A.D.2d 897, 897-98 (3d Dep't 1971). The movant must prove due execution by a preponderance of the evidence. In re Halpern, 76 A.D.3d 429, 431(1st Dep't 2010); In re Estate of Yuster, 30 Misc. 3d 1211(A), No. 825/06, 2010 WL 5584596, *3 (N.Y. Sur. Nov. 30, 2010).

Where the execution of the will is supervised by an attorney, there is a presumption of regularity and of proper execution. Matter of Kindberg, 207 N.Y. 220, 227-28 (1912); In re Tuccio, 38 A.D.3d 791 (2nd Dep't 2007). Proper execution is also presumed where there is an attestation clause and self-proving affidavit signed by both attesting witnesses which creates "a presumption that the will was duly executed and also constitute[s] 'prima facie evidence of the facts therein attested to by the witnesses.'" Matter of James, 17 A.D.3d 366, 367 (2d Dep't 2005). The burden falls to the objectant to rebut this presumption and present evidence which raises a material issue of fact. In re Halpern, 76 A.D.3d 429, 431 (citing In re Seelig, 302 A.D.2d 721, 722 (3d Dep't 2003)).

In the case at bar, Selwyn alleges that Friday did not satisfy her burden of proving due execution because neither the witnesses nor the attorney-drafter remember with specificity the details of decedent's execution ceremony and because there are discrepancies in their testimony. The law is clear that specific recall of events is not a necessary element of due execution. In re Leach, 3 A.D.3d 763, 765 (3rd Dep't 2004). Where, as here, the attorneydrafter supervised the execution and the witnesses sign self-executing affidavits, a prima facie case is made for due execution. "[T]his presumption cannot be overcome merely because the attesting witnesses are not able to specifically recall the will execution." Id. at 765. Not being able to remember the details of the execution ceremony is "not the same as testifying that the formalities described in the attestation clause did not occur." Id., quoting Matter of Ruso, 212 A.D.2d 846, 847 (2nd Dep't 1995).

The petitioner has met her burden of establishing a prima facie case for due execution of the propounded instrument in accordance with the requirements of EPTL 3-2.1. Selwyn has failed to submit proof sufficient to create a triable issue of fact. Accordingly, the motion for summary judgement dismissing the objection to probate on grounds of lack of due execution of the purported instrument is granted. Selwyn's cross-motion for summary judgement denying probate on grounds of improper execution is denied.

3) The Provisions of the Instrument are Proved by a True and Complete Copy

The attorney-drafter has stated that it is his customary practice to make two copies of a will once it is executed by the testator and the witnesses. He gives the original to the testator, gives one copy to the executor, and keeps one copy for his files on which he makes the annotation "copy" on the front page. He recalls having done this in decedent's case and states that he recognizes the word "copy" which appears on the front page of the copy submitted for probate to have been made in his handwriting. On this copy appear the signatures of the testator and the witnesses. The attestation clause and the self-proving affidavit were also copied and bear the signatures of all the witnesses.

No evidence exists in the record that raises an issue of fact concerning the assertion of the attorney-drafter that the copy submitted herein is a true and complete copy of the instrument executed by decedent. Essentially, Friday demonstrated that the decedent executed a will on November 14, 2004, in full compliance with the applicable law, that the original was turned over to her for safekeeping immediately upon its execution and was never in decedent's possession. That decedent never had the original will in his possession. Finally, the attorney-drafter testified that he made two photocopies of the fully executed will the day of its execution and maintained a copy in his office which is the one that is now offered for probate. The evidence thus establishes that the copy submitted herein is a true copy of the will. See, In re Levinsohn, 5 Misc.2d 605 (Surr. Ct. New York Co. 1957).

The inquiry, however, does not end with the finding that the instrument before the court is a true copy of the will. The proponent must still demonstrate that the will was duly executed, that the testator was in all respects competent to make the will, and was not under restraint. EPTL 3-2.1. The proponent herein has done so.

Due Execution

In his cross-motion, Selwyn has asserted that the instrument was not duly executed. For the reasons detailed above, the propounded instrument is determined to have been duly executed. The instrument was executed under the supervision of an attorney, and signed at the end by the testator in the presence of witnesses who also signed it. Moreover, the witnesses executed self-proving affidavits and attestation clauses. Accordingly, Selwyn's cross-motion to deny probate for lack of due execution is denied.

Lack of Testamentary Capacity

In his cross-motion to deny probate to the instrument, Selwyn has asserted that decedent lacked the testamentary capacity to execute a will. Friday and Cadell, as the proponents, have the burden of proving testamentary capacity. In re Watson, 37 A.D.2d 897-98 (3d Dep't 1971). Testamentary capacity requires that, at the time of execution, the testator generally understand the nature and consequences of executing a will, the nature and extent of the property she was disposing of, the people who would be considered the natural objects of her bounty, and the relationship she has with them. In re Kumstar, 66 N.Y.2d 691, 692 (1985). A testator is generally presumed to be of sound mind and to have the requisite mental capacity to execute a will. In re Beneway, 272 A.D. 463, 467 (3d Dep't 1947). The law looks with tender eyes on an aged person (Children's Aid Society v. Loveridge, 25 Sickels 387 (1877)), and illness and physical weakness are not sufficient to show incapacity to make a will. In re Haggert, 33 A.D.2d 124, 126 (4th Dep't 1969); see also In re Seagrist, 1 A.D. 615, 615 (1st Dep't 1896) (noting that even the death bed is not sufficient to nullify testamentary capacity so long as the testator possesses sufficient comprehension at the time of the will's execution). Finally, a will requires less mental capacity than other instruments. In re Carpenter, 145 N.Y.S. 365, 371 (N.Y. Sur. 1913).

Selwyn asserts that decedent lacked testamentary capacity at the time of execution of the instrument. In support thereof, he, Laidlow and St. Hillaire, without benefit of any medical or hospital records or affidavits from medical personnel, assert that decedent was legally blind, suffered from hallucinations for which he was hospitalized, was given to outbursts of anger, and suffered from "behavioral issues because of his age." Decedent's advanced age, without more, is also not sufficient to vitiate the capacity to make a will. "Mere old age, physical weakness and infirmity or disease or failing memory are not necessarily inconsistent with testamentary capacity." Matter of Benaway, 272 A.D. 463, 467 (3d Dep't 1947). The testator's capacity at the time of the execution is the critical element to be determined. "[T]he appropriate inquiry is whether the [testator] was lucid and rational when the will was made." Matter of Buchanan, 245 A.D.2d 642, 644 (3d Dep't 1997).

Not only are the assertions of lack of testamentary capacity not supported by any objective evidence, they are contradicted by other statements made by the witnesses. Large portions of the affidavits submitted by St. Hillaire and Laidlow are replete with descriptions of decedent's asserted detailed and specific demands that the will he signed at the Williams office be revoked because he had no desire to leave property to grandchildren and nieces. The court is thus asked to give credence to those statements as those made by a person clear of mind and intention but to give no effect to statements made by that same person in a formalized written instrument that he intended to serve as his last will and testament. The assertion that at the moment the will was signed decedent lacked capacity but that his capacity returned to him thereafter when he expressed his desire to revoke such will is not supported by the objectant. Moreover, in each of the attesting affidavits, the witnesses have affirmed under oath that at the time of execution, "the testator was in all respects competent to make a will and not under any restraint."

Finally, as noted earlier, at the time the 2004 will was executed, Williams had known decedent for 10 years. Decedent had lived in the neighborhood of Williams's office and had been Williams's client. Williams noted that as one who knew decedent, he observed nothing out of the ordinary in his behavior the day of the execution.

Again, the unsubstantiated, hearsay statements made by Selwyn, Laidlow and St. Hillaire do not serve to raise a triable issue of fact concerning the decedent's testamentary capacity. Accordingly, Selwyn's cross-motion to deny probate on grounds of lack of testamentary capacity is denied. Friday and Caddell's motion for summary judgement dismissing the objection on grounds of lack of testamentary capacity is granted.

Undue Influence

Much as he did with the claim of lack of testamentary capacity, Selwyn asserts that Friday exercised undue influence over decedent, but does so relying on conjecture and unsubstantiated evidence where substantial evidence is required. The court is asked to extrapolate from the sole fact that Friday was actually made decedent's health care proxy, given power of attorney and made executor of his estate, that she exercised undue influence on him. No assertion is made however, that Friday committed any financial or other malfeasance or in any way injured decedent or made off with his goods. We are told only that she had a well-known reputation among family members as one who takes the money and runs, that she deceitfully claimed to have made a $200.00 expense on behalf of decedent that was actually made by someone else, and that she unsuccessfully attempted to get decedent to sign "a blank paper" while he was allegedly hospitalized with hallucinations. Selwyn, Laidlow and St. Hillaire repeatedly assert that decedent did not like Friday, was concerned that she wanted to steal his home and property and did not wish to be around her. They also submit, however, that Friday was a resident of Canada and was seldom in New York, and that they were the principal caregivers of decedent and that they had unhampered access to the decedent.

Undue influence requires moral coercion that "restrained independent action and destroyed free agency, or which, by importunity which could not be resisted, constrained the testator to do that which was against [her] free will." In re Kumstar, 66 N.Y.2d 691 (1985); In re Englehart, 88 A.D.3d 997, 998 (2d Dep't 2011). Undue influence also requires a finding of motive, opportunity, and substantial evidence of influence actually exercised. In re Walther, 6 N.Y.2d 49, 55 (1959). Speculative evidence regarding undue influence is not sufficient to deny probate, particularly where there is a self-executing affidavit that constitutes prima facie evidence of facts attested to by witnesses. In re Estate of Korn, 25 A.D.3d 379, 379 (1st Dep't 2006).

Although a confidential relationship combined with will-drafting involvement supports the inference of undue influence (In re Neenan, 35 A.D.3d 475, 476 (2d Dep't 2006)), a family relationship-even where the beneficiary family member cared for and tended to the affairs of the decedent-counterbalances this inference. See In re Anella, 88 A.D.3d 993, 995 (2d Dep't 2011). Specifically, where evidence is consistent with legitimate influence drawn from a "caring personal relationship," it is insufficient to show undue influence. In re Estate of Gearin, 132 A.D.2d 799, 801 (3d Dep't 1987).

Selwyn, Laidlow and St. Hillaire, rather than supporting an inference of undue influence with their statements, undermine it. They paint a picture of decedent not as a man of feeble will overwhelmed and coerced by Friday, but as a person who openly, freely and fearlessly expressed his distaste for Friday and his desire not to have her involved in his affairs. They paint a picture of someone by no means isolated by a domineering, Svengali-like presence, but rather one who had easy access to many relatives and friends to whom he freely vented. Selwyn's assertions are not only unsubstantiated, they are self-contradicting.

It bears noting that even if there were proof that Friday urged decedent to change his will, that alone would not create a presumption that she acted improperly. See, In re Hollenbeck, 65 Misc.2d 796 (Surr. Ct., Jefferson Co. 1969). "A person has the right to use any reasonable and legitimate argument to induce another to make a will in a particular way. The giving of advice and the use of argument and persuasion do not constitute ground for avoiding a will by a competent executrix even if the will is made in conformity with the advice given." Id. at 800 quoting Smith v. Keller, 205 N.Y. 39 (1912). Moral coercion requires that the testator's independent action be restrained, and her free agency destroyed. See In re Zirinsky, 43 A.D.3d 946, 948-49 (2007). The requisite showing "amounts to an interference beyond mere persuasion, encouragement or suggestion." Estate of Feller, 26 Misc. 3d 1205A, 2010 N.Y. Slip Op. 50001U (Sur. Ct. Monroe County 2010).

Finally, the record indicates that decedent had concrete and prudent reasons for reducing Selwyn's share and putting it in trust. See, In re Dowdle, 224 A.D. 450, 453 (4th Dep't 1928). By Selwyn's own admission, at the time the instrument was being executed, he was institutionalized because of problems with alcohol. The record also seems to indicate that Selwyn had been in the institution for a not insignificant period of time. Finally, there are no facts to suggest that decedent was frightened of Friday, that she was isolating him, physically harming him, or engaging in behavior to overcome his will. In fact, the record indicates that Friday was more often than not in Canada. Therefore, though it could be argued that motive and opportunity were present, substantial evidence of undue influence is lacking. Selwyn has failed to produce evidence that undue influence was actually exercised, and thus failed to raise any triable issue of fact with respect thereto. Accordingly, Selwyn's cross-motion to deny probate on the grounds of undue influence is denied. Friday and Caddell's motion for summary judgement dismissing Selwyn's objection to probate on the grounds of undue influence is granted.


In order to prove fraud, the objectants must show that "the [movant] knowingly made a false statement that caused decedent to execute a will that disposed of [her] property in a manner different from the disposition [she] would have made in the absence of that statement." Matter of Clapper, 279 A.D.2d 730, 732 (3d Dep't 2001). Moreover, a finding of fraud must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. Simcusky v. Saeli, 44 N.Y.2d 442, 452 (1978). In order to defeat the motion for summary judgment on the issue of fraud, the respondent must come forward with more than "mere conclusory allegations and speculation." Matter of Seelig, 13 A.D.3d 776, 777 (3d Dep't 2004). Indeed, to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the respondent must produce sufficient evidence to show that there is an issue of fact to the effect that the proponent made a false statement or statements to the decedent to induce her to make this will, that the decedent believed the statement, and that without such statement or statements, the propounded will would not have been executed. A showing of motive and opportunity to mislead is insufficient; evidence of actual misrepresentation is necessary. Matter of Gross, 242 A.D.2d 333, 334 (2d Dep't 1997).

The objectants allege in a wholly conclusory manner that there was fraud, but fail to plead facts supporting that assertion and Selwyn provides no evidence of a false statement knowingly made by the Friday. Objectants have failed to raise any triable issue of fact with respect thereto. Accordingly, Selwyn's cross-motion to deny probate on the grounds of fraud is denied. Friday and Cadell's motion for summary judgement dismissing Selwyn's objection to probate on the grounds of fraud is granted.


For the reasons heretofore stated, the petitioner's motion for summary judgment admitting the copy of decedent's will to probate and dismissing the objections is granted. Selwyn's cross-motion for summary judgment denying probate on the grounds of improper execution, lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, and fraud is denied. The Court is satisfied that the instrument, dated November 19, 2006, is genuine and duly executed, and that at the time of its execution, the decedent was competent to make a will and was not under any restraint. EPTL 3-2.1. The court has considered the other issues presented by objectant and finds them to be without merit.

Accordingly, the instrument shall be admitted to probate as the decedent's Last Will and Testament. Upon their duly qualifying under law, Letters Testamentary shall issue to Ann Evangeline Friday who shall serve in conjunction with Sean Caddell who shall be issued Letters of Administration C.T.A.

This constitutes the decision and order of the court.

Settle decree.

1. Friday and Cadell have applied for Letters of Administration c.t.a because Friday, the named executor, is not a U.S. citizen. Sean Cadell, the decedent's grandson, is a U.S. citizen residing in New York.